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Abstract 
 
In this article, we focus on the effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade and 
agricultural income.  Given the large number of preferential trade arrangements and complex 
interactions among them, we attempt to discover whether preferential trade arrangements are 
beneficial to agricultural trade and income, and are an effective tool to liberalize agricultural 
trade.  The findings suggest that preferential trade arrangements with some exceptions tend to 
expand agricultural trade and improve agricultural income. 
 
Keywords: agricultural trade, agricultural income, gravity model, preferential trade agreement   iv
Highlights 
The main objective of this study is to explore the effects of preferential trade arrangements on 
agricultural trade and agricultural income.  Unlike other studies that have focused on the effects 
of particular trade arrangements (e.g. Zahnizer et al. 2002), this study attempts to draw a general 
picture of preferential trade arrangements and agricultural trade by using a large sample of 
countries and including most preferential trade arrangements.  Given the large number of 
preferential trade arrangements and complex interactions among them, this study attempts to 
discover whether preferential trade arrangements are, on average, beneficial to agricultural trade 
and income.  The effects of several preferential trade arrangements are given special attention 
(e.g. ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), Andean Community (CAN), EU, and NAFTA). 
We adopt a gravity equation approach developed in previous studies to measure the effects of 
preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade.  Trade creating and trade diverting dummy 
variables are included to estimate trade effects of preferential arrangements.  To estimate income 
effects of preferential trade arrangements, the instrumental variable approach developed by 
Frankel and Romer (1999) is used.  This relatively new approach relies on a geographical 
component of trade as an instrument to eliminate endogeneity bias that is often a problem in 
empirical estimations of trade-income relationships.  The basis of this model is a relationship 
between agricultural income and international and within-country agricultural trade.  Preferential 
trade arrangements affect agricultural income through several different channels. 
Preferential trade arrangements were shown to have a positive trade creating effect on 
agricultural trade, with the exception of NAFTA.  The trade creating effects were not statistically 
significant for the Andean agreement, EU, and NAFTA.  However, the overall trade creating 
effect of preferential trade arrangements was positive and significant.  Trade diverting effects 
were statistically significant and negative for the Andean agreement and NAFTA.  Overall, the 
trade diverting effect was positive, indicating that agricultural trade created among member 
countries does not crowd out agricultural trade with non-member countries, probably because of 
low substitutability between traded products.  Preferential trade arrangements may also create 
additional demand for agricultural products from non-member countries by increasing income, 
and possibly create an opportunity for trans-shipments. 
The agricultural income regression shows that agricultural trade had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on agricultural income.  Thus, given the fact that the overall effect of 
preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade was positive, the trade effects created by 
preferential trade arrangements can improve agricultural income on average.  Non-trade effects 
of preferential trade arrangements that do not influence agricultural income directly through 
international trade were predominantly negative (except for the effect of the Andean agreement) 
but were not statistically significant, except for NAFTA.  PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS: IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE AND INCOME 




There has been significant proliferation of preferential trade arrangements since the 1950s.  The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
have been notified of 254 preferential trade arrangements since 1948.  Almost half of those 
notifications came after 1995.  Many preferential trade arrangements extend their coverage to 
agricultural commodities (Grethe and Tangermann 1998; Tangermann and Josling 1999).  Some 
examples of such trade arrangements are the European Union (EU), Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Coverage of agricultural commodities is not usually as comprehensive as the coverage of 
industrial goods.  Due to the traditionally protected status of agriculture, certain agricultural 
commodities may be excluded from the lists of products that enjoy preferential treatment.  In 
addition, concessions on agricultural products typically offer lower preferential margins than 
those on industrial goods (WTO report 2002).  However, this does not necessarily prevent 
preferential trade arrangements from being effective in promoting agricultural trade and creating 
more competition in the agricultural sector. 
The main objective of this study is to explore the effects of preferential trade arrangements on 
agricultural trade and income.  Unlike other studies that focused on the effects of particular trade 
arrangements (e.g., Zahnizer et al. 2002), this study attempts to draw a general picture of 
preferential trade arrangements and agricultural trade, by using a large sample of countries and 
including most preferential trade arrangements.  Given the large number of preferential trade 
arrangements and the complex interactions among them, this study attempts to discover whether 
preferential trade arrangements are, on average, beneficial to agricultural trade and income.  The 
effects of several preferential trade arrangements are given special attention (e.g. ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (AFTA), Andean Community (CAN), EU, and NAFTA.). 
In particular, this study measures trade creation and trade diversion in agricultural trade in 
accordance with the techniques developed in previous empirical studies (for example, Ghosh and 
Yamarik 2004), using a dummy variable approach.  This study does not attempt to draw 
implications about true welfare effects of preferential trade arrangements in agriculture, since 
evidence of trade creation may not necessarily mean welfare gains (Panagariya 2000).  We limit 
ourselves to examining whether preferential trade arrangements are an effective tool for 
stimulating agricultural trade given the overall protected status of agriculture.  If the level of 
agricultural protection is high and preferential trade arrangements do not lower it significantly, 
then the effects of preferential trade arrangements can be very small.  Significant trade creation 
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in agricultural trade may be a sign of trade liberalization, albeit restricted to groups of countries 
who are members of a preferential trade arrangement. 
Having estimated the trade effects of preferential trade arrangements, this study examines the 
effects of agricultural trade and preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income.  
Empirical research on the effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade and 
income provides us with information about whether there is a beneficial side to preferential trade 
arrangements in agricultural trade, especially during times when complete trade liberalization is 
not yet achievable. 
A large body of literature examines the economic effects of preferential trade arrangements from 
theoretical and empirical perspectives.  The concepts of trade creation and trade diversion are 
widely applied as measures of trade liberalization and welfare improvement.  Examples of earlier 
theoretical works on preferential trade include Viner (1950), Mead (1955), and Lipsey (1957).  
Panagariya (2000) offers a comprehensive survey of up-to-date literature on preferential trade 
arrangements. 
Empirical studies often measure trade creation and trade diversion effects to evaluate preferential 
trade arrangements.  A bilateral trade gravity equation has been used in these studies (e.g., 
Aitken 1973; Thursby and Thursby 1987; Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose 2001; and Frankel and 
Rose 2000).  
Gravity estimations measure trade creation and trade diversion effects of preferential trade 
arrangements using dummy variables.  The core of a gravity equation is a relation between 
bilateral trade flows, economic sizes of countries, and distance.  Several trade studies derived 
theoretical foundations for the gravity relation (Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985, 1989; 
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003).  Empirical trade studies that employed a gravity setup in their 
analysis typically expanded the core gravity relation by including additional explanatory 
variables and using preferential trade dummies (Ghosh and Yamarik 2002).  Preferential trade 
dummy variables measure additional trade created or diverted from normal trade volume 
predicted by the gravity relationship. 
We adopt the gravity equation approach developed in previous studies to measure the effects of 
preferential trade arrangements on agriculture trade.  Trade creating and trade diverting dummy 
variables are included to estimate trade effects of preferential arrangements.  To estimate the 
income effects of preferential trade arrangements, the instrumental variable approach developed 
by Frankel and Romer (1999) is used.  This relatively new approach relies on a geographical 
component of trade as an instrument to eliminate the endogeneity bias that is often a problem in 
empirical estimations of trade-income relationships.  The basis of this model is a relationship 
between agricultural income and international and within-country agricultural trade.  
Preferential trade arrangements have a direct effect on international agricultural trade, which 
affects income.  However, there exist additional channels through which preferential trade 
arrangements can affect income.  They can affect agricultural income by replacing within-
country agricultural trade with trade created with foreign parties.  Preferential trade arrangements 
can also have a direct effect on agricultural income through interactions with domestic policies 
and by altering long-run production and investment decisions of agricultural producers.  The   3
effects of preferential trade arrangements are not limited to agricultural businesses that are 
directly dependent on trade.  Rather, the effects are likely to be sector-wide.  By altering 
domestic price levels, for example, preferential trade arrangements can influence incomes of 
agricultural businesses that do not engage in international trade. 
This study is organized in the following way.  First we present the model used for evaluating the 
effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade and income.  We then describe the 
data and econometric procedures used to estimate the model.  Subsequently, we discuss the 
results of the gravity equation that measures the effects of preferential trade arrangements on 
trade.  In the last section, we focus on income effects of preferential trade arrangements.  
 
THE MODEL 
Preferential Trade Arrangements and Agricultural Trade 
The empirical model used to estimate the relationship between preferential trade arrangements 
and agricultural trade and income consists of two parts.  The first part includes a standard gravity 
trade equation modified to include preferential trade effects, and the second part includes a 
regression that connects agricultural trade and income. 
Equation 1 presents a standard trade gravity equation in which trade, GDP, and distance 
constitute the core of a gravity relationship wherein trade is proportional to countries’ GDP and 
inversely proportional to distance between them. 
ij ij ij ij ij j i ij e S a PTAd a PTAc a d a y a y a a x + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1   (1)
where  ij x  represents a logarithm of bilateral trade flows;  i y  is a logarithm of GDP;  ij d  is a 
logarithm of distance between two countries;  ij PTAc  is the trade creating dummy variable that 
equals 1 if countries i and  j  participate in the same preferential trade arrangement;  ij PTAd  is 
the trade diverting dummy variable that equals 1 if only either country i or  j  is a member of a 
preferential trade arrangement; and  ij S  represents other variables that have effects on trade. 
The original gravity relation does not include other factors,  ij S .  However, many studies have 
included them either because of theoretical considerations derived from other trade models (e.g. 
Aitken 1973; Thursby and Thursby 1987; Feenstra et al. 2001; Frankel and Rose 2000; Harris 
and Mátyás 2001; and Ghosh and Yamarik 2002, 2004) or because they believed that the 
variables can help explain bilateral trade flows.  The other factors usually included are 
geographic variables like countries sharing a common border, being landlocked or located on an 
island; historical factors such as colonial history and common language; monetary factors that 
include exchange rate volatility and exchange rate regimes; trade policy factors; development 
factors such as GDP per capita and difference in per capita income across countries; and factors 
that measure relative factor endowment.   4
The gravity equation includes two PTA dummy variables.  Trade creation is represented by a 
positive coefficient ( 5 a ) on a dummy variable that equals 1 if two countries are members of a 
preferential trade arrangement and 0 otherwise.  This dummy variable measures trade between 
two countries that is created in addition to normal trade flows predicted by a gravity setup.  
Trade diversion is measured by a coefficient ( 6 a ) on a dummy variable that equals 1 if only one 
of two countries is a member of a preferential trade arrangement and 0 otherwise.  This 
coefficient, which is expected to be negative, measures how much trade between two countries is 
diverted if one of them is outside of a preferential trade arrangement. 
A set of variables that is usually included in a gravity equation can potentially lead to an 
endogeneity problem.  In particular, income and PTA dummies, along with other variables, can 
be correlated with the error term.  This occurs because, due to the specification of a gravity 
equation, some important variables that are correlated with trade and explanatory variables (e.g. 
policy variables) can be omitted.  We do not expect this to be a significant problem in the case of 
agricultural trade because policies that affect GDP or the decision to form a preferential trade 
arrangement are unlikely to be dependent on the volume of agricultural trade. 
Income Effects of Preferential Trade Arrangements 
The model we use to estimate the effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural 
income is based on the model developed by Frankel and Romer (1999), in which agricultural 
income depends on international agricultural trade, within-country agricultural trade, and other 
factors.  This relationship is shown in Equation 2.  Although the levels of international 
agricultural trade ( i X ) and within-country agricultural trade ( i WT ) are influenced by preferential 
trade arrangements, we also add a separate variable ( i PTA ) in the model to indicate the direct 
effect of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income. 
i i i i
A
i PTA WT X y ε α α α α + + + + = 3 2 1 0   (2)
where 
A
i y  is agricultural income;  i X  is the value of agricultural international trade;  i WT  is the 
value of agricultural trade within a country;  i PTA  represents the direct effect of preferential trade 
arrangements; and  i ε  includes all other possible factors that influence agricultural income. 
Preferential trade arrangements can affect agricultural income through different channels.  The 
main channel is agricultural trade itself, because preferential arrangements are expected to 
increase agricultural trade volume.  The effect of increased trade is reflected in agricultural 
income through coefficient  1 α .  Preferential trade arrangements can also affect within-country 
trade by replacing it with imports, which consequently affects agricultural income (coefficient 
2 α ).  Adoption of preferential trade arrangements can also relate to changes in domestic 
agricultural policies that can influence agricultural income.  A preferential trade arrangement can 
increase the confidence of domestic agricultural producers by ensuring better access to foreign 
markets, which can decrease uncertainty and lead to investment/production decisions that are not 
related to current trade flows.  Preferential trade arrangements can also introduce more 
competition from abroad, changing domestic prices and affecting all agricultural businesses, not   5
only ones that engage in international trade but also those that are not engaged in international 
trade.  Those effects of preferential trade arrangements are captured by the model through 
coefficient  3 α . 
To complete the model, we need two additional equations that describe international agricultural 
trade (Equation 3) and within-country agricultural trade (Equation 4).  Following Frankel and 
Romer (1999), international agricultural trade depends on geographical and demographic 
characteristics of trading partners ( i D ) and other unaccounted factors ( i δ ).  Variable  i PTA  
accounts for the effects of preferential trade arrangements on international agricultural trade.  
i i i i PTA D X δ β β β + + + = 2 1 0   (3)
Within-country agricultural trade depends on the size of the country ( i S ) represented by such 
variables as land area and population, preferential trade arrangements ( i PTA ), and other factors 
( i ρ ). 
i i i i PTA S WT ρ γ γ γ + + + = 2 1 0   (4)
The data on within-country agriculture trade is not available for a majority of the countries.  
Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the income equation by inserting the within-country trade 
equation, which yields the following model for measuring income effects of preferential trade 
arrangements in agriculture 
) ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 0 2 0 i i i i i
A
i PTA S X y ρ α ε γ α α γ α α γ α α + + + + + + + =   (5)
The income effects of preferential trade arrangements that are passed through international 
agricultural trade in Equation 5 are measured by coefficient  1 α , as in the original income 
equation (Equation 2).  Direct income effects of preferential trade arrangements are measured by 
coefficient  3 α  as in Equation 2.  The coefficient on the preferential trade variable in Equation 5 
( 2 2γ α ) measures the combined effects of preferential trade arrangements that change within-
country trade on agricultural income. 
 
ESTIMATING INCOME EFFECTS 
To model the relationship between agricultural income, and agricultural trade and preferential 
trade arrangements, we use a simple linear regression structure derived in the previous section.  




















 is a variable that measures significance of preferential trade arrangements. 
The agricultural trade variable measures agricultural trade of a country with the rest of the world.  
Population and area are measures of country size and are predictors of countries’ internal 
agricultural trade.  They were denoted by  i S  in the theoretical specification of within-country 
trade (Equation 4).  To model the effect of preferential trade arrangements in the income 
equation, apart from the effect through trade, there are several choices.  The simplest one is to 
use the number of preferential trade arrangements in which a country participates.  However, this 
variable may not be a good choice as it ignores size effects of partner countries.  A more realistic 
measure of a country’s involvement in preferential trade would be a sum of partner countries’ 
sizes weighed by the distance (following Frankel and Rose’s study of currency unions (2000)). 
Empirical models that deal with effects of trade on income are prone to endogeneity problems.  
In income regression, endogeneity is very likely because agricultural income is used instead of 
GDP.  Various governmental policies have simultaneous effects on agricultural trade and output.  
For example, farm subsidies affect both agricultural output and agricultural trade.  Sometimes, it 
is difficult to account for such endogenous policy linkages in empirical models because of their 
complexity and/or poor data availability.  In such cases, the trade variable is correlated with the 
error term that includes unaccounted policy effects. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) solved the endogeneity problem of trade in output estimations.  They 
used geographic variables such as distance, population, a dummy for landlocked countries, and a 
dummy for common border in order to correct for endogeneity bias.  Geographic characteristics 
tend to influence trade flows and are usually not correlated with countries’ income.  Frankel and 
Romer regressed international trade on a set of geographic variables and then used aggregated 
fitted value  i X ˆ  (geographical content of trade) as an instrumental variable in the output 
regression.  We adopted their technique to our particular case, using agricultural trade as a 
dependent variable (Equation 7). 
ij ij j i j j i i ij ij e cb b l l b p b n b p b n b d b b X + + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) (   (7)
where  ij X  is agricultural trade, n is population,  p  is area, l is a dummy variable for landlocked 
countries, and  ij cb  is a dummy variable for common border. 
Having estimated Equation 7, we construct an instrumental variable that is calculated as a sum of 
fitted values across trading partners: 
( ) ∑
≠
+ + + + + + + + =
j i
ij j i j j i i ij i cb b l l b p b n b p b n b d b b X 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ     .  (8)
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The geographical trade content variable ( i X ˆ ) is then used as an instrument to estimate the effects 
of agricultural trade and preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income in Equation 6.  
Since this instrument is correlated only with geographic characteristics, it should be orthogonal 
to the error term that includes unexplained policy variations. 
Finally, having estimated the income equation and gravity trade equation, we can estimate the 
effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income.  First, preferential trade 
arrangements will affect trade flows between countries through coefficients  5 a  and  6 a  in gravity 
equation (1), and then the resulting changes in trade will affect agricultural income through 
coefficient  2 c  in Equation 6.  Preferential trade arrangements will also affect agricultural income 
through within-country trade and direct production impacts.  However, we cannot distinguish 
between them because data on within-country agricultural trade is unavailable for most 
countries.  Their combined effect is measured by coefficient  5 c  (coefficient  2 2 3 γ α α +  in 
Equation 5). 
 
DATA AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
We used a cross-section of the latest available data for 1999.  Data on agricultural trade flows 
were obtained from the World Bank Trade and Production Database.  Since import data are 
generally more reliable than export data (Nicita and Olarreaga 2001), we used mutual imports to 
calculate overall agricultural trade between each country pair.  Information on current 
preferential trade arrangements was obtained from the website of the World Trade Organization.  
There were 131 preferential trade arrangements reported to the WTO.  Data on agricultural 
income (agricultural value added), population, land area, and gross domestic product were 
obtained from World Development Indicator database maintained by the World Bank.  Data on 
common currencies, languages, landlocked countries, and border-sharing were obtained from 
Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook.  Distances between countries, measured as 
distances between their capitals, were calculated using a computer program (the program was 
developed by John A. Byers) that contained data on latitudes and longitudes of major cities in the 
world. 
The use of cross-sectional data requires us to make adjustments to usual Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators used to estimate agricultural trade and income 
models, since error terms in cross-sectional regressions tend to be heteroskedastic.  The standard 
OLS and instrumental variable estimators produce unbiased estimates of regression coefficients.  
However, the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix are inconsistent in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, leading to incorrect test results.  To correct for heteroskedastic bias in the 
variance-covariance matrix, we use White’s estimator for OLS and instrumental variable 
regressions (Greene 1997).  An attractive feature of White’s estimator is that it can be applied to 
regressions with an unknown type of heteroskedasticity.  For OLS, White’s estimator of the 
variance-covariance matrix is 
1 1 ) )( ( ) ( ˆ − − ′ ′ ′ ′ = Σ X X X e e X X X OLS , where  X  is the matrix of 
dependent variables and  e e ′ is a matrix of the products of residuals with all off-diagonal 
elements being equal to zero.  This estimator was also used for tests of trade creation and trade   8
diversion effects (White 1980).  For the instrumental variable estimator, the robust variance-
covariance estimator is 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ) ( )( ) )( ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ˆ − − − − − − ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ = Σ X Z Z Z Z X X Z Z Z Z i i Z Z Z Z X X Z Z Z Z X IV   (9)
where Z  is a matrix of instruments and  i i ′ is a matrix of the products of IV residuals with all 
off-diagonal elements being set to zero (see Baum et al. 2002). 
When estimating income effects, we construct the instrument for the endogenous trade flow 
variable, using variables and coefficient estimates from the gravity regression.  The presence of 
coefficients from another regression, which are stochastic variables, requires an adjustment of 
























OLS A ˆ ˆ , where a is a vector of IV regression coefficients and b  is a 
vector of OLS coefficient estimates. 
 
ESTIMATION OF GRAVITY RELATION FOR AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of estimation of the agricultural trade model.  
As it was shown in the theoretical section, agricultural trade is a function of various economic, 
geographic, and demographic factors.  In addition to the core variables of the gravity 
relationship—countries’ GDPs and the distance between trading partners—we have included 
countries’ populations and land areas.  We also accounted for several demographic and 
geographic factors that countries can have in common and which can facilitate trade between 
countries: common borders, languages, currencies, and colonial history.  We expect that those 
factors will have positive effect on agricultural trade.  
The effects of preferential trade arrangements are introduced in the model using a dummy 
variable.  We use a trade creation dummy to see if common membership in one or several 
regional trade agreements generates trade between countries in excess of the trade predicted by a 
gravity relationship.  Using a preferential trade dummy, we measure the trade effects of 
preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income.  If preferential trade arrangements 
generate positive trade, this, in turn, can improve agricultural income, provided agricultural trade 
and agricultural income are positively related. 
We also measure the effects of countries not participating in a preferential trade arrangement 
using a trade diversion dummy.  The trade diversion dummy is expected to have a negative sign, 
since trade is likely to be diverted from the countries outside of a preferential trade arrangement.  
However, it is possible for it to have positive effect.  There can be several explanations.  In this 
study, agricultural trade is highly aggregated.  Therefore, if agricultural products traded with 
member and non-member countries are not substitutes, increased trade with member countries as 
the result of a preferential trade arrangement may not preclude expansion of agricultural trade 
with non-member countries.  Also, preferential trade arrangements typically cover a wide variety 
of products and services, of which agricultural products often constitute a small part.  Increased   9
trade between members of preferential trade arrangements can positively affect countries’ overall 
income, generating more demand for imports that may not necessarily originate in member 
countries.  Another explanation can be that countries who are members of a preferential trade 
arrangement may not maintain the same level of protection against exports from non-member 
countries, thus allowing trans-shipments.  Trans-shipped commodities may require an additional 
level of processing in a member country, which may not be a high enough barrier to discourage 
exports from non-member countries.  Finally, a trade diverting dummy for a particular 
preferential trade arrangement can be correlated with trade creating dummies that are not 
explicitly accounted for if member countries participate in other trade arrangements with non-
member countries.  Inclusion of a trade creating dummy that reflects the combined effect of 
preferential trade arrangements mitigates this effect. 
Preferential trade arrangements differ in terms of their size and coverage.  We chose several 
regional trade agreements that seem to be the most important in different parts of the world and 
for which the data were available, and estimated their effects on agricultural trade and income.  
In specific, we chose NAFTA and CAN to represent the Western Hemisphere.  AFTA and the 
EU were chosen to represent Asia and Europe, respectively.  All of these regional trade 
agreements extend their coverage to agricultural commodities.  General information on AFTA, 
CAN, the EU, and NAFTA is summarized in Table 1.  To account for the effects of these 
preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade, trade creating and trade diverting dummies 
were developed to indicate countries’ participation in the regional trade agreements.  The 
estimation results are presented in Table 2, which includes trade creating and trade diverting 
effects of PTAs.  Variables PTAcij and PTAdij represent the combined trade creating and trade 
diverting effects of preferential trade arrangements.  The rest of the trade creating and trade 
diverting dummies isolate the effects of AFTA, CAN, EU, and NAFTA.    10
 
Table 1. Agricultural Provisions for Selected Regional Trade Agreements 
RTA  RTA Countries Coverage  Description 
AFTA (1992) 
ASEAN Free Trade Area 
 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam  
Reduced tariffs on trade in 
processed agricultural 
products.  Gradual reduction 
of tariffs on unprocessed 
agricultural products by 2003. 
CAN (1988)  
Andean Community 
 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Venezuela 
 
Trade between all member 
countries with the exception of 
Peru is fully deregulated and 
duty free. 
EC-15 (1958) European 
Communities (now EU) 
 
 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom 
Common Agricultural Policy.  
Free movement of agricultural 
goods between the 
communities. 
NAFTA (1994) 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement 
 
Canada, Mexico, and United 
States 
 
Agricultural tariffs between 
the US and Canada were 
removed by 1998 with few 
exceptions covered by TRQ’s.  
Most agricultural tariffs and 
all non-tariff barriers between 
the US and Mexico were 
eliminated, and some tariffs 
are being phased out over 5 to 
15 year period.  Agricultural 
tariffs between Canada and 
Mexico followed the same 
pattern; however tariffs on 
dairy, poultry, eggs, and sugar 
remained (FAS). 
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Table 2. Agricultural Trade Estimation Results 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Deviation 
Constant -26.763 ***1.324 
ln(GDPi) 0.951 ***0.046 
ln(GDPj) 0.938 ***0.043 
ln(Distanceij) -0.872 ***0.068 
ln(Populationi) -0.306 ***0.049 
ln(Populationj) -0.312 ***0.063 
ln(Landi) 0.191 ***0.039 
ln(Landj) 0.185 ***0.041 
Landlockedij -0.796 ***0.141 
Bordersij 0.865 ***0.267 
Currencyij 0.6 ***0.218 
Languageij 1.116 ***0.155 
Historyij 0.639 ***0.212 
PTAcij 0.673 ***0.244 
AFTAcij 2.369 ***0.31 
CANcij 0.814 0.694 
ECcij 0.24 0.278 
NAFTAcij -1.224 0.843 
PTAdij 0.42 **0.167 
AFTAdij 0.817 ***0.171 
CANdij -0.834 ***0.164 
ECdij 0.209 0.126 
NAFTAdij -0.584 ***0.149 
2 R  = 0.646 
Trade Creation & Diversion = 0; 
2 χ (10) = 155.7 
Trade Creation = 0; 
2 χ (5) = 102.5 
Trade Diversion = 0; 
2 χ (5) = 76 
Number of Observations = 1,356 
*** – significant at 1% 
**– significant at 5% 
 
The regression results show that most of the traditional gravity variables have a statistically 
significant impact on agricultural trade.  GDP has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on agricultural trade.  The effect of the distance between countries was negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that countries that are located close to each other will trade more.  
Population had a negative and statistically significant effect on agricultural trade.  These results 
may suggest that larger countries have more agricultural trade opportunities domestically, and 
therefore would be less involved in international trade, replacing it with within-country trade.    12
Land area had a statistically significant and positive effect on agricultural trade in most of the 
cases.  One would expect a positive coefficient on a land area variable because, accounting for 
countries’ populations and GDPs, large distances within a country may encourage additional 
international trade with the countries located nearby. 
If countries did not have direct access to a sea or an ocean, their ability to engage in agricultural 
trade was diminished.  The coefficient on the landlocked variable was negative and statistically 
significant.  If countries shared a common border, agricultural trade between them tended to be 
higher.  Common currency, common language, and common colonial history also had 
statistically significant, positive effects on agricultural trade, as expected. 
Preferential trade arrangements, on average, had a positive and statistically significant effect on 
agricultural trade.  The overall trade creation coefficient was positive and statistically significant 
at 1% (Table 2).  The overall trade diversion effect was also positive and statistically significant 
at 5%.  The trade creation coefficient supports the hypothesis that preferential trade arrangements 
create trade opportunities for agricultural producers despite less coverage of agricultural 
commodities as compared to manufacturing products.  The positive effect of the trade diverting 
dummy indicates that additional trade due to preferential trade arrangements does not necessarily 
divert trade from non-member countries.  Agricultural products traded with member and non-
member countries may not be substitutes; thus, preferential arrangements do not preclude 
agricultural trade expansion with non-member countries.  Instead, the arrangements may 
stimulate demand for agricultural products from countries outside a preferential trade 
arrangement by increasing countries’ overall income.  There is also a possibility of 
transshipments due to non-uniform trade protection levels in countries who are members of a 
preferential trade arrangement. 
The trade creation effects of selected regional trade agreements were positive, except for 
NAFTA, but most of them were not statistically significant.  Only AFTA had a statistically 
significant impact on agricultural trade. 
AFTA had the most prominent effect on agricultural trade.  It was four times higher than the 
average effect of all preferential trade arrangements.  The trade creating effect of the Andean 
agreement was slightly above average, and the trade creating effect within the EU was below 
average. 
In regard to trade diverting effects of the selected preferential trade arrangements, CAN and 
NAFTA had the expected negative sign and were statistically significant.  AFTA and the EU had 
positive trade diverting effects, although the trade diverting effect of EU was not significantly 
different from zero.  This can be explained in the same way as it was for an average trade 
diverting dummy PTAdij: regional trade arrangements may result in additional demand for 
imports from non-member countries or traded agricultural products exhibit low degree of 
substitutability.  However, positive trade diversion effects in the case of particular preferential 
trade arrangements can simply be a proxy for other preferential trade arrangements with non-
member countries that were not explicitly included in the regression.  This may be the case with 
the EU, whose member countries have preferential trade arrangements with countries in Eastern 
Europe and North Africa.   13
The net effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade, obtained by comparing 
trade creating and trade diverting effects, were positive overall.  The exceptions are the Andean 
agreement and NAFTA, which are considered trade diverting since their trade diverting 
coefficients were negative and statistically significant and trade creating coefficients were not 
statistically different from zero.  Finally, in Table 2 we tested the overall statistical significance 
of trade creating and trade diverting effects.  The hypothesis that trade creation and trade 
diversion effects were zero was rejected at conventional statistical levels. 
 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
AGRICULTURAL INCOME 
The results of trade regressions show that participation in preferential trade arrangements has an 
overall positive impact on agricultural trade.  To show that trade effects of preferential trade 
arrangements influence agricultural income, we need to estimate a statistical relationship 
between agricultural income and agricultural trade.  An agricultural income equation is set as a 
linear function of agricultural trade, land area, population, and variables that capture the effects 
of preferential trade arrangements that are not a direct result of international agricultural trade.  
The results of the agricultural income regression are presented in Table 3. 






Constant -307.242 ***132.778 170.17 136.047 
Tradei 2.593 ***0.253 2.79 ***0.296 
Landi -8.584 11.030 -8.212 10.308 
Populationi 1.136 ***0.093 1.071 ***0.085 
PTAi -1.984 1.671 
AFTAi -14.859 ***4.543 
CANi 4.578 17.838 
ECi -1.212 1.827 
NAFTAi     -0.277 1.645 
 
2 R =0.909 
2 R  = 0.955 
Number of Observations = 53 
*** – significant at 1% 
 
An instrument was required to estimate the relationship between agricultural income and 
preferential trade arrangements because the agricultural trade variable is endogenous.  The 
instrument was constructed by regressing agricultural bilateral trade on countries’ geographic 
characteristics and then obtaining a variable containing predicted agricultural trade.  Distance, 
countries’ land areas, populations, landlocked status, and the presence of common borders were 
chosen as explanatory geographic variables.   14
The agricultural income regression separates the effects of regional trade arrangements on 
agricultural income into two categories: the ones that pass through agricultural trade and those 
that influence within-country agricultural trade and production decisions (non-trade effects).  
Since previous gravity estimations showed that participation in preferential trade arrangements 
increases agricultural trade, a positive coefficient on the trade variable in income regressions 
(Table 3) would suggest positive trade effects of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural 
income.  Non-trade effects are measured by coefficients on the variables indicating participation 
in preferential trade arrangements.  Preferential trade variables in the agricultural income 
regression are constructed as sums of member countries’ GDPs weighed by distance. 
The IV estimation of agricultural income equations shows that agricultural trade has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on agricultural income.  Given that preferential trade 
arrangements were shown to be trade creating on average, trade effects of preferential trade 
arrangements would have positive effects agricultural income. 
Land areas of trading partners had a negative but statistically insignificant effect on agricultural 
income.  Since land area is an explanatory variable in the within-country agricultural trade 
equation, its effect on agricultural income is expected to be negative because within-country 
trade occurs over larger distances.  Population had a positive and statistically significant impact 
on agricultural income.  This effect is also as expected because one would anticipate more 
within-country trade if a country has large population.  Within-country trade, in turn, is expected 
to expand agricultural income. 
The average non-trade effect of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income ( i PTA ) 
was negative but statistically insignificant.  The negative sign suggests that by displacing within-
country agricultural trade and altering agricultural production and the business environment, the 
arrangements can harm agricultural producers.  Preferential trade arrangements can bring more 
competition to local markets, lowering domestic prices and affecting agricultural businesses that 
may or may not be involved in international agricultural trade.  Preferential trade arrangements 
can alter vertical and horizontal linkages between agricultural businesses that may, on average, 
result in an income decline.  However, statistical insignificance shows that the non-trade effects 
of preferential trade arrangements are unlikely to diminish the positive and statistically 
significant effects of preferential trade arrangements resulting from international trade.  
Although there is no expected sign on the non-trade income effects of preferential trade 
arrangements, the coefficients on specific regional trade agreements tended to be negative (with 
the exception of CAN) but statistically insignificant (NAFTA and the EU).  Only AFTA had a 
negative and statistically significant non-trade impact on agricultural income. 
Due to the insignificance of non-trade income effects, we also estimated an income regression 
without them.  This did not significantly change the coefficient estimates for trade, population, 
and land size effects.  Both agricultural trade and population continued to have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on agricultural income.  
These empirical results show that agricultural trade expansion due to participation in preferential 
trade arrangements may be beneficial as far as agricultural income is concerned.  Preferential 
trade arrangements have a positive effect on agricultural trade, as was shown from the gravity   15
regression.  Agricultural trade, in turn, has a positive effect on agricultural income.  There is a 
possibility that non-trade effects of preferential trade arrangements can negatively influence 




In this article we analyzed the effect of preferential trade arrangements on agricultural income.  
We presented an empirical model that separated income effects of preferential trade 
arrangements into trade related and non-trade related effects.  The model was then estimated, 
using 1999 cross-sectional data on bilateral agricultural trade and agricultural income. 
The model consisted of two parts.  In the first part, we isolated the trade effects of preferential 
trade arrangements, using a gravity equation.  The second part included both types of effects of 
preferential trade arrangements – the effects resulting from international trade and the within-
country trade and non-trade effects.  The income equation in the second part of the model was 
estimated using the instrumental variable technique because of a concern for common factors 
affecting agricultural income and agricultural trade, correlating the latter with the residuals.  The 
instrument was constructed based on the geographical content of agricultural trade. 
Preferential trade arrangements were shown to have positive trade creating effects on agricultural 
trade, with the exception of NAFTA.  The trade creating effects were not statistically significant 
for the Andean agreement, the EU, and NAFTA.  However, the overall trade creating effect of 
preferential trade arrangements was positive and significant.  Trade diverting effects were 
statistically significant and negative for the Andean agreement and NAFTA.  The overall trade 
diverting effect was positive, indicating that agricultural trade created between member countries 
does not crowd out agricultural trade with non-member countries, probably because of low 
substitutability between traded products.  Preferential trade arrangements may also create 
additional demand for agricultural products from non-member countries by increasing income, 
and they could possibly create an opportunity for transshipments. 
The agricultural income regression showed that agricultural trade had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on agricultural income.  Thus, given the fact that the overall effect of 
preferential trade arrangements on agricultural trade was positive, an increase in trade volume 
through preferential trade arrangements can improve agricultural income on average.  However, 
non-trade effects of preferential trade arrangements that do not influence agricultural income 
directly through international trade were predominantly negative (except for the effect of CAN) 
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